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Abstract Upgrading logistic services in the context
of international supply chains is not a smooth
process. Upgrading may require the development of
co-operative relationships, or alliances, involving
large logistic service firms and their customers:
multinational enterprises. Both sides may be unwill-
ing and/or unable to engage in upgrading strategies in
an alliance context. Fourth-party logistics is an
example of a logistic product innovation entailing
research-based advice as well as the design and
implementation of new supply-chain solutions. It has
the potential of stimulating spatial shift in global
production networks and regional distribution sys-
tems (Visser and Lambooy, Geographisches
Zeitschrift 92(heft 1+2):5–20, 2005). Using dynamic
transaction-cost theory (Nooteboom, Learning and
innovation in organisations and economies, 2000),
this paper theoretically specifies and empirically
measures three risks associated with the development
of fourth-party logistics: dependence, unwanted spill-
overs, and conservatism. Case-study evidence reveals
that dynamic transaction-cost theory partially
explains the slow development of new logistic
services in an alliance setting. Some aspects of
conservatism are found to be relevant, along with
risks of dependence due to specific investments in
human resources and information systems. Other,
not predicted but important factors, however, are the
lack of credibility of service innovation by asset-
based logistic firms, and strategic considerations of
customers regarding logistic organization and con-
trol. The first factor implies that firms specializing
in fourth-party services are likely to remain (very)
limited in number. The second factor implies that
this type of service provision is more likely to
develop in dynamic port clusters, as customers
prefer to tap into a variety of ideas from many
different suppliers. In local clusters, interactions
between firms can be relatively frequent, casual,
short-lived and open, so that the structure of local
networks is relatively decentralized, dense and
flexible. This stimulates (logistic) innovation
(Nooteboom, in Hanusch and Pyka (eds.) Elgar com-
panion to neo Schumpeterian economics, 2006). In
global supply chains, interactions between logistic
service firms and their customers tend to have the
opposite characteristics, which do not stimulate
innovation.
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Logistics has become a key element in the compe-
tition strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
In a setting of enhanced logistic complexity resulting
from globalization, these so-called ‘business owners’
concentrate on marketing, R&D, sales, and customer
service functions, outsourcing the remaining activi-
ties to manufacturing and logistic firms. While MNEs
increasingly face complex global logistic challenges
(Christopher 1998; Hertz and Alfredsson 2003) while
competing on the basis of logistic performance
(delivery reliability, service differentiation, and so
forth), they may not be fully willing to go so far to
allow specialized logistic service providers resolve
supply-chain optimization and integration problems
(maximizing service at minimum costs). Similarly,
such service provision does not develop automati-
cally, despite the advantages of specialization,
increasing demand for logistic research, advice,
design, and implementation services, and decreasing
profit margins in the logistics sector (Van Klink and
Visser 2004).
This paper assumes that the above hurdles may be
the result of certain risks associated with 4th party
logistics (a function) by firms adding these value-
added services to their portfolio and/or specializing in
this direction. Fourth party logistics requires the
development of alliances between usually large and
internationally-operating logistic-service providers
(LSPs) and their even larger, internationalized cus-
tomers (MNEs). New information and communication
technologies (ICTs) may contribute to alliance devel-
opment, but the assumption in this paper is that residual
uncertainties remain and that the associated transaction
costs (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985) still have to be
reduced. Other issues related to routines (Nelson and
Winter 1982), path dependence (Boschma et al. 2002),
dynamic capabilities (Zollo and Winter 2002), learning
(Nooteboom 2000), and trust (Nooteboom 2002) may
also play a role, and will be addressed in this paper.
The purpose of the study reported here was to use
and test empirically the relevance of dynamic trans-
action-cost theory (Nooteboom 2000; Visser and
Lambooy 2005) for analysing the development of 4th
party logistics as an example of higher value-added
services. We have followed three steps to achieve this
purpose. The first is the description of the competitive
impetus for 4th party logistic service provision. The
second is the specification of a theoretical framework
to detect factors hindering or triggering the develop-
ment of this service type. The third is case-study
research on the development of 4th party logistics in
the setting of a reverse logistics operation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section
‘‘Defining 4th party logistics’’ describes and defines
4th party logistics as an example of value-added
services and as a function that existing LSPs may add
to their portfolio of services, or that other (new) firms
may specialize in. Problems that may hinder 4th party
logistic service development according to dynamic
transaction-cost theory are specified in section
‘‘Problems hindering logistic service upgrading.’’
The research methodology is elucidated in section
‘‘Methodology.’’ Section ‘‘Evidence’’ reports the
analysis of case study evidence. Our conclusions
are presented in section ‘‘Discussion.’’
Defining 4th party logistics
Over the last few decades, MNEs anxious to improve
their global competitiveness have emphasized the
supply chain as the principal area to improve
competitiveness (Supply-Chain Council 2004).1
Awareness is growing that it is not individual firms,
but supply chains that compete with each other in
selling products to final users (Bradley and Nolan
2000; Evans and Wurster 1997; Normann and
Ramirez 2000; Rayport and Sviokla 1995). In addi-
tion, the total cost/service performance of a supply
chain influences the purchasing decisions of final
users. A chain, however, is as strong as its weakest
link. Hence, supply-chain management (SCM) is
critical. SCM aims at the integration of all the
activities of all the firms in a chain in order to fulfil
the demands of final customers more effectively and
efficiently (Berglund et al. 1999; Ludema 2002). This
integration often goes hand in hand with supply-chain
reversal: using demand information upstream so that
1 This paper focuses on MNEs, as these are global players that
increasing act like ‘business owners’ concentrating on the core
competencies of marketing, R&D, sales, and customer service,
outsourcing the remaining activities to both manufacturing and
logistic firms. Hence, demand for 4th party logistic service
functions is expected to be highest for this firm category.
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demand-pulled activities substitute for those that are
supply pushed.
The emphasis on SCM may yield networked
supply chains that are orchestrated by MNEs, and
possibly also their LSPs. The expertise of LSPs can
contribute to continuous improvements in the cost/
service performance of supply chains, on the basis of
product and process innovations, but also by sug-
gesting new supply-chain configurations. Next, LSPs
are involved in organizational innovations, since they
move towards new positions in supply chains to
generate higher added value for themselves (Panay-
ides and So 2005; Carbone and Stone 2005). To be
precise, 2nd party LSPs—subcontractors performing
operational activities such as transport or warehous-
ing for a customer (the 1st party), may transform into
a 3rd and/or start fulfilling 4th party services and
functions (see Table 1). It is important to note that the
classification in 2nd, 3rd and 4th party services is
about functions, not firms. An important issue in this
paper is whether 4th party logistic functions may be
developed by existing and asset-based firms (LSPs)
adding these services to an existing portfolio of 2nd
and/or 3rd party services, or that other firms, e.g.
newcomers, may more easily move in this direction.
In the 1980s, logistic outsourcing led to the rise of
3rd party logistic service provision (Peper and Van
Goor 2001), in the context of which supply-chain
performance is optimized by centralizing and up-
scaling operational tasks within the logistics firm,
and/or by subcontracting these tasks to second-tier
suppliers. In the former case, 3rd party LSPs and their
clients may reap economies of scale and scope in
logistic operations. In the latter case, 3rd party LSPs
screen, select, contract, monitor and evaluate the
performance of 2nd party firms, thus reducing
transaction costs of outsourcing for the customer. In
both situations, a 3rd party LSP ensures one-stop
shopping for customers who retain the strategic
control over the basic supply-chain concept used. In
other words, they improve the operational effective-
ness of chains, on the basis of first-order learning
(Nooteboom 2000), but are not yet involved in
strategic decisions concerning the basic logistic
concept. In contrast, 4th party functions comprise
undertaking research and advice on how to
Table 1 Differences between 3rd and 4th party logistic services
3rd party services 4th party services
Activities Centralizing, upscaling and geographically
expanding logistic tasks.
Subcontracting operational tasks to 2nd party
service firms (screening, selecting,
contracting, monitoring and evaluating
their performance)
Research, advise, design, develop (test),
implement and monitor new supply-chain
solutions
Position in supply chain (network) Contact with customer, but often not with
vendors. Incomplete access to information.
Focus on freight and information flows
Contact with all actors in the chain, overview
of their activities and flows between the
actors: products, information and finance
Type of linkage with customer Semi-hierarchy: long-term contracts
(between 1 and 5 years)
Networked: strategic alliance,
‘co-shippership’
Strategic goal Achieving scale and scope economies, by in
or outsourcing.
Customer: outsourcing non-core activities,
reduce logistic costs
Logistic firm: enhance added value.
Customer: logistic excellence. Reduced costs
and enhanced service
Rationale Reducing transaction costs (of customers)
and logistic cost (transport, warehousing,
handling)
Improving service while reducing total
supply chain costs (all actors, all flows,
all types)
Knowledge effects 1st order learning: exploiting existing
know-how
2nd order learning: developing new
knowledge and logistic concepts
Type of transaction costs Static: related with either internal
management and control or search,
screening, matching, monitoring and
enforcement in markets
Dynamic: related with specific investments
in knowing and understanding each other
(people and processes)
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reconfigure supply chains spatially and functionally
for improved supply-chain performance. Next, these
functions include designing, developing, testing,
implementing, and monitoring new supply-chain
solutions. LSPs involving in these activities do so
in a setting of strategic alliances with customers (‘co-
shipperships’; De Wit and Van Gent 2001), where
information sharing and joint problem solving may
yield second-order learning. This induces the parties
involved to propose and develop new logistic prod-
ucts and processes, i.e., logistic innovations.
As yet, there is hardly any empirical data available
describing the extent to which 4th party logistics
develops in different firms, countries or regions.
However, there is reason enough for both MNEs facing
complex global logistic challenges (Christopher 1998;
Hertz and Alfredsson 2003) and LSPs suffering
decreasing profit margins in competitive markets
(Van Klink and Visser 2004) to add 4th party services
to their portfolio or to specialize in this type of value-
added functions. Nevertheless, existing LSPs seem to
only slowly move in this direction (for evidence on the
Dutch logistics industry, see Salden and Konrad 2005).
This may be due to certain risks associated with
upgrading services by existing LSPs in a setting of
strategic alliances with customers. This paper concen-
trates on these risks and problems.
Problems hindering logistic service upgrading
This section features potential problems hindering the
development of 4th party services. One may say that
this development simply requires the implementation
of new ICTs, but we hold another view. We use
learning, innovation and transaction cost theory
(Nooteboom 1992, 2000, 2006) to depict three
problems that may affect the development of 4th
party logistic functions and which may need to be
resolved by mechanisms other than ICTs. The
transaction cost concept (understood as the costs of
transacting under uncertainty and managing the risks
of dependence and spillover in inter-firm relation-
ships) implies that the effect of reducing transaction
costs by new ICTs is limited (Visser and Lambooy
2005). Below, we describe three central problems that
MNEs and LSPs may encounter when developing
value-added services such as 4th party logistics, and
then derive a few hypotheses for empirical testing.
Dependence
According to transaction cost economics, specific
investments induce a risk of dependence (relational
risk), since these investments are lost in the event of
opportunistic behaviour by the other party. A dis-
tinction may be drawn between these specificities:
physical assets; human (or knowledge) assets; loca-
tion (or site) assets; dedicated assets. Depending on
the importance of suppliers (in terms of sales in
absolute or relative figures), MNEs outsourcing
logistics rely increasingly on LSPs, which may be
perceived as risky in a situation where logistic cost/
service performance is key in global competition and
failure may cause a loss in market share. Conversely,
however, LSPs make specific investments: in ware-
houses (physical assets); at a location required by
customers (site specificity); software (dedicated
assets); and/or training (human capital specificity).
Hence, both parties may perceive a risk of depen-
dence. The problem may deteriorate in the case of 4th
party logistic service provision, since MNEs ask
LSPs to develop novel solutions for complex logistic
problems. Meeting this request requires both parties
to invest time and money in knowledge exchange and
make specific investments in a common language,
mutual understanding, and trust (Nooteboom 2002).2
The real problem with these dynamic transaction
costs is the elapse of time between the perception of
risk and investments at the start of a relationship, and
future compensation in terms of yet uncertain supply-
chain improvements (Visser and Lambooy 2005).
We may measure the risks of dependence from the
viewpoint of the supplier or the buyer, distinguishing
between gross and net dependence. Gross dependence
refers to the one-sided dependence as perceived by
one party on the other. Net dependence refers to the
2 Transaction costs are thus also important in a dynamic
perspective. The traditional argument is that asset-specificity
induces sunk and switching costs, creating lock-in in the
relationship with the firm for which the investment was done.
Nooteboom (Ibid.) argues that specificity is also related to
‘‘investments in crossing cognitive distance: in building
appropriate absorptive capacity and capacity to make oneself
understood by the partner’’. This argument is based on a
cognitive theory of learning, where learning is thought to take
place on the basis of cognitive categories (rules of thought),
which ‘condition knowledge in the double sense of enabling
and limiting it’ (Nooteboom 2000, pp. 154–156).
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degree to which one party perceives itself to be more
dependent on the other than vice versa.
Solutions to perceptions of risk of dependence fall
into three categories: (a) balancing; (b) compensa-
tion; (c) eliminating causes of transaction costs.3
Balancing refers to the point mentioned above that
both parties are vulnerable to behavioural risks on the
side of the other party. Compensation refers to
safeguards (contracts, hostages). In the category of
eliminating the causes of transaction costs, ICT may
serve to reduce bounded rationality on the side of the
buyer by disclosing the performance of supply chains
and the role of various parties, including LSPs
fulfilling 4th functions. This disclosure helps reduce
the transaction costs of the buyer, but adds to the
vulnerability and transaction costs on the suppliers’
side insofar as they are responsible for investing in
specific software, hardware, and so forth. Trust is
another helpful mechanism in eliminating the causes
of risk. Trust is a predisposition to accept vulnera-
bility in a context of opportunism and bounded
rationality, expecting that a partner will not default
but live up to more or less explicit expectations,
agreements, norms and codes of conduct (see Noote-
boom (2002) for an analysis and definition of trust;
see Nooteboom (2006) for an analysis of the relation
between trust and the transaction costs of learning
and innovation in networks). A final mechanism in
the category of eliminating the causes of transaction
costs is that of dynamic capabilities. These reflect a
capacity to foresee the future benefits of a logistic
alliance (in terms of learning and innovation: new
products, processes or chain configurations that
reduce supply-chain costs and enhance service levels)
and trade these benefits against perceived risk. So,
dynamic capabilities entail the capacity to foresee
and anticipate the future benefits of an innovation and
balance them against current efforts, investment and
costs effectively. Dynamic capabilities counteract
bounded rationality and reduce opportunism as
parties align short-term behaviour with long-term
benefits. For operationalization purposes, we may
take instances of knowledge exchange as proxies for
dynamic capabilities, particularly in a setting of long-
term projects that do not yield immediate benefits.
The above yields the following hypothesis for
empirical research (H1): the problem of dependence
will be especially relevant for MNEs enabling LSPs
to fulfill 4th party functions, due to specific invest-
ments in transferring knowledge towards LSPs
regarding the business of MNEs; vulnerability to
logistic failure (implying serious loss of market
share); and uncertain benefits in the form of future
supply-chain improvements. The thus increasing net
dependence of MNEs can not be fully compensated
nor eliminated; hence, it will hinder the development
of 4th party services by LSPs.
Unwanted loss of knowledge
Outsourcing also involves a risk of unwanted loss of
knowledge (spillover risk). MNEs outsourcing logis-
tic activities lose in-house logistic expertise, while
the supplying LSPs accumulate the expertise required
for the (specific) supply chains of the outsourcing
party. This effect of experience (first-order learning)
gives the LSP oligopolistic power, which is rein-
forced by internal economies of scale and scope in
logistic operations. Risks of spillover also become
evident, however, in the case of knowledge exchange
between LSPs and MNEs working together to arrive
at new solutions for complex global logistic prob-
lems. Such cooperation yields dynamic transaction
costs related to anxiety about the potential leak of
innovative logistic expertise to competitors.
The causes of spillover risk are fourfold: they
relate to learning by interaction (relevant for both
parties); competition (where suppliers also work for a
buyer’s competitors, which is a threat to the latter);
integration (where a buyer includes supplier expertise
in its operations, insourcing instead of outsourcing,
which is a risk for suppliers); competition between
suppliers (where buyers may use various suppliers,
urging them to adopt each other’s innovative or best
practices). Hence, we may measure the risk of
unwanted loss of knowledge from two viewpoints
and in gross and net terms, so that four indicators of
vulnerability obtain.
Solutions to spillover risks are in the same
categories as those of dependence risks. Hence,
balancing is possible, since both MNEs and LSPs
are vulnerable. Compensation may be possible with
the help of safeguards such as an extensive contract
specifying the duration of a certain supply and its
3 The last solution is related to the foundations of TCE:
opportunism; bounded rationality; specific investments; uncer-
tainty; transaction frequency. See Visser and Lambooy (2005).
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exclusive nature (an LSP may not use certain
infrastructure in its work for competitors of the
buyer, and so forth). In the case of logistics,
compensation may thus prevent the use of multi-user
infrastructure. In the category of eliminating causes,
ICT is not likely to be of help. ICT tends to be
specific, consisting of tailor-made software and other
infrastructure, which may not be used for competitors
for technical or contractual reasons. By its specificity,
investing in ICT tends to augment the transaction
costs for the investor, often the LSP. Trust is a helpful
mechanism, however. In the case of spillover risks,
trust in loyalty (intentional trust) is important for both
parties, next to conditional trust and also informa-
tional trust (for both parties). Dynamic capabilities
can also counteract the problem of spillover if parties
opt for the long-term benefits of logistic partnerships
instead of the short-term gains of opportunism.
The above yields the following hypothesis for
empirical research (H2): the problem of spillover will
increase for MNEs allowing an LSP to provide 4th
party services, not so much due to learning by
interaction (as that is relevant for both parties and
thus constitutes a balanced problem) but especially
competition—the LSP also works for the MNE’s
competitors and may thus leak novel logistic know-
how in undesirable directions. Hence, the risk of
unwanted spillover will hinder the development of
4th services, especially in a setting of bilateral
logistic alliances, involving two partners.
Conservatism
A general problem in supply chains that might also
hinder 4th party service development is a lack of
supply-chain awareness among the actors involved.
This awareness should include an ability and/or
willingness on the side of these actors to think in
terms of the total costs of procuring, transforming,
administering, transporting, and distributing products
along the chain, along with an ability and/or willing-
ness to consider the utility of co-operation within
supply chains in terms of costs and service. Disregard
of the collective roots of supply-chain excellence is
thus the result of a combination of partiality
(considering only some, not all costs) and self-
centredness (considering oneself, not all concerned).
Past business and past linkage experience are two
other causes of conservatism. On the side of MNEs,
we may think of routines in procurement departments
where personnel continue to focus on procurement
prices, despite the fact that these only represent a
fraction of total procurement and/or supply-chain
costs (inability). Procurement managers may follow a
divide-and-rule model and exercise the traditional
buying power of the MNE, with a view to incentives
rewarding such behaviour, whereas effective supply-
chain management requires constructive relationships
with suppliers. On the side of LSPs aspiring the
provision of 4th party services, path dependence and
routines may play a part, especially if these develop
out of existing logistic service firms that have grown
on the basis of traditional transport, warehousing, and
forwarding activities. Well-proven and long-standing
rules of business conduct seem attractive—in both
good and bad times—compared with the uncertainties
associated with such innovative services as 4th party
logistics.
So, the causes of the problem of conservatism
relate to partiality and self-centredness in the analysis
of supply-chain costs and the benefits of supply-chain
co-operation, to past business experience (routines),
and to linkage experience (memory of key events in
relation to other actors in the chain introducing
feelings of pride, humiliation, respect, or hurt).
Solutions may comprise ICT (insofar as it promotes
supply-chain transparency, thus solving the problem
of insufficient awareness while eroding vested inter-
ests); incentives for change-oriented behaviour
(although these depend on the dynamic capabilities
of top managers); trust in (a) the capabilities of the
other party to understand the importance of SCM,
logistic alliances, and system innovations, and the
intentions of the other party to move in these
directions, and in the conditions enabling actors to
do so, and (b) dynamic capabilities. The latter should
stimulate the intensity and quality of knowledge
exchange to the extent that the parties involved can
break through the walls of conservatism we refer to
above (Nooteboom 1992; Visser 1996; Nooteboom
2000).
The above yields the following hypothesis for
empirical research (H3): the problem of conservatism
is a two-sided problem throwing a long shadow over
the issue of 4th party services, as it negatively affects
the perception of the future benefits of developing
these services, and thus withholds both parties to
embark on this road. The problem gets worse,
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however, in the case of existing asset-based LSPs,
where path dependence and routines in the form of
well-proven and long-standing rules of business
conduct may significantly hinder innovative actors
aiming at change that yet has to stand the prove of
time and experience. In this case, MNEs may be even
more suspicious about the benefits of 4th party
service provision by specialist logistic firms.
Considering the above theoretical problems, new
ICTs alone are not at all likely to serve as catalysts
for 4th party services. Other variables related to
dynamic transaction theory hinder this type of
logistic innovation, and need to be addressed sepa-
rately. The problems of dependence, unwanted
spillover and conservatism are all expected to be
significant in hindering 4th party logistic service
development (hypotheses 1, 2 and 3). A task for
empirical work is to verify whether or not these
hypotheses hold, and in case they do, to assess the
relative importance of the three problems.
Methodology
A research method is selected according to: (a) the
nature of the research problem (with case studies
appropriate for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and
surveys for ‘who,’ ‘what,’ and ‘how much’ ques-
tions); (b) the degree of control over events (when
high, experiments may be chosen; when low, case
studies or surveys are appropriate); (c) the past or
ongoing nature of events or processes (when pro-
cesses are ongoing, case studies are most appropriate)
(Yin 2003). In the present research context, these
three criteria steer in the direction of case studies.
The question of this paper is why 4th party logistics—
a relatively new concept for which there may be
demand from MNEs facing globalization and which
may be attractive for LSPs facing lower profit
margins—hardly develops, and how this can be
explained.
Case studies serve not only exploratory and
descriptive goals, but also explanatory purposes
(Yin 2003). The design of a case study is closely
related to the underlying theoretical framework. The
researcher has to elaborate research questions, using
alternative theories. In the setting of the current
study, we used dynamic transaction costs theory to
elaborate and specify research questions, a rival
assumption being that new ICTs alone may enable
the development of 4th party services (see the
previous section).
Next, the unit of analysis has to be identified.
Above, we have repeatedly stated that 4th party
services develop in the context of supply chains and,
more specifically, alliances between MNEs and LSPs.
So, these alliances are the unit of analysis, in the
setting of which we review the nature and extent of
logistic service provision, the associated information
exchange, and developments in this regard. However,
the unit of analysis may differ from the sources of
data, which may be so-called ‘embedded cases.’ In
our case, we identified a specific operation in the
context of an alliance between a LSP with one of its
clients, where the target data was identified and
collected through in-depth interviews.
The case study concerned was undertaken in
2006 on a reverse logistics operation (RLO) by a
large, internationally operating LSP working for an
even larger multinational customer in the computer
industry. We held two or, when necessary, three
structured interviews with in total four high-ranking
managers who were primarily responsible for the
RLO on both sides of the relationship; two persons
in each company, occupying positions such as
‘director operations hi-tech logistics,’ ‘director oper-
ations spare-part logistics,’ and the like. When
possible, the interviews were face-to-face; other-
wise, they took place during telephone
conversations. In the latter case, the questionnaire
that served as a basis for the interview was sent by
e-mail as an attached file for the respondent to read
beforehand. In total, 51 questions were asked,
covering the relevance of 4th party service devel-
opment, the relevance of the three potential
transaction-cost related problems in hindering this
development, and the causes and solutions, includ-
ing the use of new ICTs, for these problems (the
questionnaire is available through ESM). The ques-
tions asked for a response in the form of a score on
a 5-point Likert scale along with supplementary
explanations. This qualitative information has been
helpful in analysing the quantitative data. After
concluding the RLO case study, we explored the
validity of the results for other operations of the
LSP for several customers. We did so during a face-
to-face semi-structured interview and subsequent
email communication with the director of the
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Product Development & Strategy department of the
LSP.
The analysis of case-study data differs from the
analysis of survey data. Case-study analysis is based
on ‘pattern-matching,’ where the key question is the
extent to which the data match up with the different
propositions derived from rival theories (see the
previous section). This logic of relating case-study
data to theory is referred to as analytical or theoret-
ical generalization. In statistical generalization, a
case is merely part of a population, and statistical
rules are used to relate these cases to that population,
not with any theory concerning that population. In
theoretical generalization, case-study results may be
used to confirm, reject, amend or expand a certain
theory (Ibid.). Critical case studies are used to collect
and match data with rival theoretical propositions; the
result of the matching process is the acceptance or
rejection of the rival theories. The below case study
fits this purpose. We used it to reject the rival
hypothesis that new ICTs are sufficient to stimulate a
product innovation such as 4th party logistic services,
and to test the proposition that problems related with
dynamic transaction-cost theory are relevant and
explain the lack of development towards this type of
services.4
Evidence
In this section, we report the case-study evidence
regarding the factors determining 4th party logistic
service development. We first describe the case
before presenting the evidence from two viewpoints:
the LSP’s and the customer’s.
Background
In 1996, the customer firm signed a contract with a
joint venture of two LSPs for the distribution of
products to end users in nine European countries. A
third LSP joined in later as a subcontractor. This firm
was soon responsible for one third of the contract
value. The customer asked the newcomer to develop
a new, additional operation focused on reverse
logistics in the Benelux and Iberian markets. This
operation concerned return flows of small numbers of
malfunctioning products, which are the result of
customer service contracts. The operation grew by
400% in 2004, which is indicative of the importance
of the reverse logistics market but also of the
evolving relationship of the customer and the new
LSP. Today, the two firms maintain a direct relation-
ship, with the LSP perceiving the customer as ‘‘an
innovative customer, with progressive ideas concern-
ing logistics, outsourcing and partnerships’’ (oral
communication of an LSP director, 25 June 2006).
However, the relationship is also prone to ‘‘draw-
backs and mixed feelings’’ (Ibid), which may be
interesting in the light of the present study. Below,
we consider the LSP’s views of the state of devel-
opment of logistic services in the context of the RLO
operation; we then turn to the customer’s views on
these issues.
The LSP’s point of view
The LSP considers its relationship with the customer
to be moving towards a partnership, where interac-
tions take place to discover the relative strengths and
weaknesses of different solutions proposed on both
sides for one and the same problem, to analyse
mistakes, to determine who can be entrusted with the
role of problem solver, and so forth. Meetings are
held to discuss the direction of the relationship. These
often reinforce the position of the LSP as a logistic
solution finder, in line with the critical assessments of
the logistic initiatives of the customer. Trust is
evolving slowly on the basis of experience, interac-
tion, openness, and mutual respect.
The three problems that potentially hinder 4th
party service development (dependence, vulnerability
to spillover, and conservatism) are relevant, however.
The two interviewed LSP managers originally
thought that dependence was the principal,
4 This is not easy. Nooteboom, however, observes that
‘‘variables such as asset specificity, transaction costs, innova-
tion and trust are difficult to measure, [...] but [can be treated]
as ‘latent ones’, which can be seen as being ‘spanned’ or
‘indicated’ by indicators that can be measured, often assessed
by people on a five- or seven-point Likert scale. (...) The
indicators can be combined into a joint variable, as an indirect
measurement of the underlying latent variable’’ (2002, p. 156).
Accordingly, we combined the indicators into a joint variable
when drafting, testing, and revising a questionnaire for
structured interviews.
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vulnerability the second, and conservatism the third
most important of these. In the course of the
interviewing process, however, it became clear that
conservatism was a complex concept that had to be
explained and understood well. Other arguments and
considerations cropping up later shed new light on the
nature of this problem, which eventually resulted in a
higher ranking: first place. This reconsideration
brought LSP’s perceptions in line with those of the
customer (see Table 2).
Starting with the problem of dependence, the LSP
mentions several factors: human asset specificity,
investments in IT, knowledge exchange between the
customer and LSP managers, the importance of the
customer for the LSP (in terms of turnover) and vice
versa (in terms of financial impact). Human asset
specificity arises as a result of specific investments in
expertise regarding reverse logistics. IT system
development also requires initial specific investments
in interface development and data entry, but the LSP
devotes considerable effort into turning these specific
systems into generic products that are marketable to
other customers as well. Research is a key feature in
this regard, since it contributes to the LSP’s under-
standing of what should be measured, how the
performance of reverse logistic systems should be
evaluated, and what activities can be standardized.
This experience, knowledge, and the supporting IT
can be included in other service offerings. Specific
investments in human capital do not induce a high
Table 2 Relevance, causes and solutions to three problems hindering 4th party logistics
Customer LSP
Dependence Relevance (ranking) 2nd 2nd (after correction)
Causes – Specific investments in IT, human
capital and mutual understanding
– Financial impact of logistic failure
– Specific investments in human capital,
knowledge exchange, and IT
– Financial importance of customer
Solutions – Require LSP to make specific
investments, so that net dependence of
either party on another is reduced
– Research to turn specific into generic
products (eliminating specificity)
– Intentional, informational, material, and
competence trust
– Dynamic capabilities
Vulnerability Relevance 3rd 3rd (after correction)
Causes – Customers talking to competitors
– LSPs using ideas and methods for other
customers
– Labour mobility
– Customers talking to competitors
Solutions – Geographic complementarity
– Compensation by limited substitution
– Confidentiality agreements
– Embedded and hard-to-copy nature of
IT systems
– ‘It is a small world’
– Implicit norms
Conservatism Relevance 1st 1st (after correction)
Causes – Lack of supply-chain awareness among
some parties in the chain (not the LSP).
– Physical asset-based nature of ongoing
work of LSPs, which reduces the
credibility of advisory work
– Physical asset-based nature of current
work: net cannibilizing effect of 4PL
services
– Lack of strategic reorientation of
investment towards 4PL services (LSP)
Solutions No comments Strategic choices
Other – Lack of and uncertainty about the value
added of 4PL services
– Credence product nature of 4PL,
requiring time before explicit payment
mechanisms will be in place.
– Effective coordination of the process of
transforming a 2nd or 3rd party into a
4th party logistic business
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level of dependence of LSP, however. LSP’s net
dependence on the customer is rated as ‘low.’
Solutions to the problem of dependence do not entail
investing in IT, extensive contracts or incentive
schemes, but do involve (in order of importance)
intentional trust, informational trust, material trust,
and competence trust (see Nooteboom (2002) for an
explanation of these different aspects of trust).
Dynamic capabilities are also important.
One issue with respect to unwanted spillovers is
labour mobility. Consider, for example, an LSP
engineer involved in the development of an advanced
IT system who moves to a competitor, where he
develops a similar system. This development would
take about 1.5 years, however, owing to the embed-
ded nature of the system, which only works on the
basis of the LSP’s experience with return logistics,
interface development, team work, and so forth.
Another mechanism is a customer passing on a
logistic novelty of an LSP to the firm’s competitors.
Informal agreements not to do so are sufficient.
Monitoring these agreements is easy, since the
logistics service industry is a small world. Overall,
the LSP does not consider itself to be vulnerable in
gross terms, while the firm’s net vulnerability is
almost negligible.
Regarding conservatism, both parties are consid-
ered to be ‘somewhat conservative.’ Reverse logistics
may provide a relatively positive situation, however,
since although this activity is challenging, it does not
require substantial new investments in physical
infrastructure. There is plenty of scope for creativity
in bringing down transport and cross-docking costs.
In other chains, past investments in storage and
warehousing activities are important, enhancing the
attention paid to fill rates by account managers on the
LSP side. In these chains, procurement managers on
the customer’s side have incentives (discounts on
larger purchases) or have the power to impose
sourcing decisions despite disagreements with mar-
keting and service departments within the customer
firm or with an LSP. So, stock levels and storage
costs may increase more than they should from a
logistic and marketing point of view. Finally, logistic
services may be purchased on a cost basis, disre-
garding the quality and problem-solving skills of
LSPs. In this case, conservatism leads to ‘penny-wise,
pound-foolish’ outsourcing linkages that prevent
relationships growing into effective logistic alliances.
So far, the evidence provided by the LSP leads us
to confirm the three hypotheses specified in section
‘‘Problems hindering logistic service upgrading;’’
transaction-cost related problems are relevant and
seemingly hinder the development of 4th party
functions in the context of an alliance involving an
existing LSP and its customer. The supplementary
qualitative information provided by the two intervie-
wees gives more information, however, confirming
that customers are usually responsible for designing
logistic chains, and that the LSP usually is not
involved. When outsourcing logistics, customer
requirements are quite standard. However, the LSP
always considers whether the work a customer
requests can be carried out straightforwardly or
whether it can only be done if the LSP is allowed
to improve the supply chain. This improvement
requires research, advice, design, development,
implementation and monitoring of alternative pro-
cesses and products. So, work for a customer almost
always consists of a bundle of simple outsourced
tasks, after which the LSP starts launching proposals
for more effective SCM. Customers expect logistic
firms to develop these proposals without contractual
requirements, however. As a result, 4th party logistic
work is relevant but not paid for in an explicit
manner.
To deal with this problem, the LSP often creates a
budget for R&D activities in drawing up a contract.
Next, its managers seek contact with students of
(technical) universities to promote applied research
linked to ongoing business, which bears insignificant
costs. They also assign one or two recently-recruited
employees with an academic degree to the team
working on a contract, to promote interaction with
older employees with different educational and
professional backgrounds and undertake research
with a view to optimizing supply-chain performance.
On the whole, however, the LSP under review solves
the problem of the lack of explicit budgets for 4th
party services and expectations to develop activity in
this direction by following two guidelines: (1) serve
the customer’s wish to reduce supply-chain costs,
including payments to the LSP; (2) pursue new
supply-chain solutions as long as these do not
‘cannibalize’ current business. The first point implies
investing in process efficiency so that cost savings
exceed tariff and fee reductions, which generates a
profit for the LSP. The second point means that the
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LSP may not want to move (at least not so fast) into
the provision of 4th party services. New supply-chain
concepts may work against short-term financial
interests related to the deployment of existing assets,
which cannot be compensated by the sale of
advanced services such as 4th party logistics. This
last problem in turn is the result of the credence good
nature (cf. Visser and Lanzendorf 2004) of these
services; a customer is unable to know before, during,
and after consumption whether the service provided
has been useful. To see this, we will turn to the point
of view of the customer.
The customer’s point of view
Considering the activities of the LSP under review in
the setting of various operations, the customer does
not feel that the supplier is moving towards the role
of 4th party service provision. According to one
manager, ‘‘supply-chain design and optimization
services generally spring from our own organiza-
tion.’’ This in-house approach is the result of the
specific logistic experience that customers have built
up over a long time: expertise that is fully in line with
specific product and market circumstances. If 4th
party services develop, they would be within the
customer’s organization or through a spin-off firm.
On the whole, the customer prefers to carry out
strategic logistic work in-house. The customer even
provides the LSP under review with a reason for
reinforcing the 2nd party profile, saying that subcon-
tracting by LSPs reveals their weak internal cost
structure. If a subcontractor of my LSP is cheaper
than my LSP, ‘‘why would I not deal directly with
that subcontractor?’’ This reasoning drives on 3rd
party logistics based on internal scale and scope
economies and geographical expansion, where the
main difference from 2nd party services is the
possibility of one-stop shopping that the 3rd party
provider offers.
The customer nevertheless considers relationships
with LSPs in terms of partnerships. As one manager
put it: ‘‘our suppliers are partners owing to the
increasing connectivity of firms: the need to adjust,
fine-tune and connect IT systems, the time it takes to
do so (many man-days, even years!), and the mutual
understanding required before we can work together.
Ask our suppliers, and they’ll say that we’re complex.
A lot of understanding is needed about what we want,
what is possible, how long it takes to change
something, and so on’’ (oral communication, 12 July
2006). So, the interdependence of customers and
LSPs is the result of specific investments in IT,
human resources, and mutually-shared knowledge.
The customer under review therefore prefers to work
with existing suppliers and not to keep changing
them. New firms trying to enter the supply network
find doing so difficult. Their value proposition should
be clear and related to design services or radically
new solutions.
Turning to the three problems that may hinder 4th
party logistic service development, the customer
indicates that some aspects of conservatism are key
features, with dependence ranking second and spill-
over the least important problem. To explain
conservatism, the respondents point at the asset-
based nature of LSPs: the resources they spend in
physical assets, the need to safeguard the rate of
return on these investments, and the resulting reduced
credibility of advisory and design activities by the
same firm. ‘‘They can only supply 4th party services
after everything else has been taken care of.’’ Hence,
the customer views the problem of conservatism as
very relevant (score 5 on a Likert scale from 1 to 5,
see also Table 2).
Regarding the problem of dependence, specific
investments in IT and the understanding of each
other’s business processes cause (inter) dependence,
high switching costs, less competition, and fewer
opportunities to ‘‘squeeze suppliers.’’ There is ‘‘no
plug and play in logistics’’ owing to the need to adjust
IT systems across the boundaries of the firms
involved. There are so many connections and inter-
faces, and the systems are so complex, considerable
experience and interaction are required to work
together. This requirement is also the case for 2nd
and 3rd party services, not only 4th party functions.
According to the customer under review, replacing
one supplier by another takes more than a year. In the
meantime, logistic performance is the key to compe-
tition in global markets, so that switching implies a
risk of reduced competitiveness and loss of market
share. Customers thus also depend on LSPs. The
converse is also true; LSPs also make specific
investments (in warehouses, on belts, and so forth.),
so that dependence is mutual and net dependence is
moderate. LSPs are expected to make specific
investments despite the absence of detailed written
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contracts specifying transaction volumes, contract
duration, penalties, and so forth.
Regarding unwanted knowledge spillover, this risk
may be present on both sides of the relationship, but it
is not important. The LSP that loses an idea to its
competitors via a customer does not see this as a
problem, because of geographic complementarity. If
the LSP works in the Benelux and the competitor is in
Scandinavia, spillovers do not threaten the LSP’s
short-term interests in the current market. Entry into
new markets may be more difficult, but the LSP
receives compensation, since customers ‘‘do not
change suppliers like their underwear’’ in present
markets. For customers, spillover risks are not very
important. LSPs are professional enough not to reveal
this type of spillover, or they agree on how to do it.
Analysis of the data reveals that there is a problem
with the high ranking of conservatism in Table 2. In
section ‘‘Problems hindering logistic service upgrad-
ing,’’ conservatism comprises elements of partiality
and self-centredness regarding the analysis of supply-
chain costs and the benefits of supply chain integra-
tion, along with elements of past business and past
linkage experience. In the case study, the two parties
argue that the physical asset-based nature of the work
of LSPs hinders a transition towards 4th party
logistics. For the LSP, the cannibalizing effect of
the latter type of service is important, along with the
problem that customers are unable to judge the value
of these services and so they do not pay for them. As
a result, the risk arises of losing 2nd and 3rd party
business5 with insufficient compensation from the
sale of new services. This financial argument has
little to do with conservatism as defined in section
‘‘Problems hindering logistic service upgrading.’’ The
three hypotheses are also confirmed on the basis of
the customer’s point of view, but there seems to be
something else going on.
From the customers’ viewpoint, the credibility
problem also exists without sunk costs. The customer
under review in the case study reasons as follows: for
improved supply-chain performance, one needs
advice, and certainly good advice, but most of all
variety in advice. It is, therefore, interested in
consulting logistic specialists, since it needs ideas
and advice for effective SCM, but it has no interest in
talking to only one firm (and certainly not one who
has a clear interest in a certain type of advice).
Instead, it wants to gather a number of contrasting
ideas and viewpoints and use these as input in its own
logistic centre performing other 4th party tasks:
designing, developing, testing, implementing, and
monitoring new supply-chain solutions. So, it wants
to retain in-house absorptive capacity, in the first
place, and it wants to gather, interpret, and analyse a
variety of ideas and advices from various logistic
specialists—LSPs able to provide 4th party inputs
and ideas, in the second place. The quality of advices
benefits from both variety and competition. Compe-
tition compensates for credibility problems that result
from the ‘credence good’ nature of logistic advice
and the asset-based work of LSPs. Variety stimulates
innovation based on the possibility to compare ideas.
So, rather than ‘conservatism’ on either side of the
relationship, the brake on 4th party service develop-
ment derives from a variety requirement that
constrains specialization in 4th party service provi-
sion and that leads to insourcing instead of
outsourcing of this function by customers. This
variety requirement on the customer’s side goes
beyond the three dynamic transaction-cost related
problems used in this paper, thus putting the impor-
tance of the analytical framework and the three
problems specified in section ‘‘Problems hindering
logistic service upgrading’’ into perspective.
Validity
After concluding the case study on the RLO, we
conducted a semi-structured interview with the
director of the Product Development & Strategy
Department of the LSP under review to assess the
validity of the case-study results (see Table 2) for
other operations of the LSP, for the customer under
revies as well as other customers. The main result of
this interview and later communication was that the
ranking of problems would not change in the setting
of these other operations. This stability is largely the
result of the multi-user nature of large investments in
physical infrastructure, such as warehouses, which
reduces the specificity of these investments and the
potential problem of one-sided dependence. Some
5 Considering the doubts of customers concerning the added
value of such services, the LSP even goes so far as to expand
3rd and 2nd party activities, thus showing customers they get
‘value for money’. Insourcing may thus be important in
resolving a credibility problem.
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customers may ask for a dedicated service, but in
these cases, a 3–5-year contract compensates for the
enhanced dependence of the LSP. The problem of
dependence is, then, not ameliorated in a setting of
operations requiring large investments in physical
infrastructure.
Another matter came up at the interview, stressing
the importance of the credibility issue. Customers
requiring dedicated warehouses obtain exclusiveness
at the expense of scope economies in handling and
fixed costs. Simple price comparisons may stimulate
the same customers to look for alternative suppliers
after a contract expires. LSPs are aware of this risk of
losing business, and respond by raising switching
costs, mainly by making specific investments in IT
and human resources, which have to be undertaken
on both sides of the relationship. In this way, an LSP
raises interdependence as a way of retaining custom-
ers. According to the interviewee, this defensive
attitude is common among asset-based LSPs. In our
view, it reinforces the credibility problem once these
LSPs engage in 4th party services.
Discussion
This paper explores the relevance of dynamic trans-
action-cost theory for analysing the pace of
development of a logistic system innovation: 4th
party logistic service provision. Case-study evidence
allows us to draw three sub conclusions: one on the
relevance of two rival assumptions (regarding the role
of IT and transaction costs); a second on the relative
importance of three problems derived from dynamic
transaction cost theory; the third concerns the possi-
bility that other explanatory factors are at work. The
first sub conclusion is that IT reinforces rather than
diminishes problems associated with 4th party logis-
tics. Therefore, to say that IT alone may stimulate 4th
party logistic service development overlooks the
complexity of the issues and risks at stake. A second
sub conclusion is that the dynamic transaction-cost
framework contributes to an explanation of the slow
development of 4th party services, but only partially.
The issue of conservatism ranks first, before the
problems of dependence and spillover. A third sub
conclusion is that other problems also hinder the rise
of 4th party logistics. The physical asset-based nature
of existing LSPs is particularly important in this
regard. For buyers, this reduces the credibility of 4th
party logistic advice; for suppliers, it is a financial
disincentive to embark on this road. The credence-
product nature of 4th party logistics is another issue
that goes beyond the dynamic transaction cost
framework. The greater the extent to which goods
and services display features of credence products,
the greater is the trust required for a transaction to
take place and a relationship to change. There may be
little trust in the usefulness of a service, so that
explicit payment is also missing. To resolve this
problem, aspirant 4th party LSPs should invest in a
good track record and customer relationship upgrad-
ing, specialize in certain industries, disinvest in
traditional activities, establish an independent sub-
sidiary or stimulate spin-offs. Such a program would
require a very high quality of strategic decision-
making and dynamic capabilities on the part of LSPs,
however, along with a high quality of change
management to steer organizations of the size of a
large LSP in this new direction. The question is
whether such orientation and action on the LSPs’ part
are enough, considering the strategic considerations
on the customers’ part. The MNE in our study prefers
to retain logistic expertise and strategic control within
the firm, which is understandable given the features
of global competition and the consequential impor-
tance of logistics. They want to retain their own
absorptive capacity for strategic decision-making
regarding new supply-chain designs, and require a
number of logistic specialists to contribute to this. A
more networked solution comprising different inputs
from multiple specialists who may enter and leave the
network appears to be preferable to a stable and
closed bilateral partnership between specialist (the
LSP) and customer (the MNE). Such a partnership
allows customers to strike a balance between the
beneficial effects of insourcing and outsourcing, and
competition and cooperation.
To conclude: specialized 4th party service firms
are likely to remain limited in number. Independent
subsidiaries and spin-offs of existing logistic firms as
well as industry entrants from other sectors (IT,
software) have a better chance of developing 4th
party services than existing and asset-based LSPs.
Furthermore, value-added services like 4th party
logistics may more easily develop in dynamic
clusters, e.g. well-managed port areas, where cus-
tomers may tap into a variety of logistic firms to
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develop new concepts. In clusters, interactions
between firms are relatively frequent, casual, short-
lived and open, so that the structure of inter-firm
networks is relatively decentralized, dense and flex-
ible. In supply chains, logistic alliances tend to
centralize and involve LSPs and customers only, so
that networks tend to be hierarchical, exclusive and
well-structured, implying relatively rare, formal,
repetitive and closed inter-firm interactions, which
does not stimulate innovation.
Future research should test these two emerging
hypotheses, i.e. that existing and asset-based LSPs
are less likely to develop value-added services such
as 4th party logistics than new entrants, spin-offs and
independent subsidiaries, and that 4th party services
are more likely to develop in (dynamic) clusters than
elsewhere in a region lodging logistic activities.
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